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OFFENSES OF SEX OR VIOLENCE? CONSENT ,
FRAUD, AND HIV TRANSMISSION
Sharon Cowan*
Given the current criminalization trend, the motivating question of this article
is whether or not sexual transmission of HIV, without speciﬁc consent to the risk
of such transmission, should be categorized as an assault or a sexual assault, and
what difference that (re)categorization might make. In the argument that
follows, the criminalization discourses in Canada and England and Wales that
underpin and permeate the debates over HIV transmission will be explored.
These jurisdictions have been chosen as examples of two regimes, at almost
opposite ends of the criminalization spectrum, in which recent changes have set
new benchmarks for criminal responsibility. One (England and Wales) has set
rather narrow limits on the criminal law, whilst the other (Canada) has set far
broader parameters, and lately has begun to include other sorts of cases (such as
deception about the absence of birth control) as analogous to the HIV cases,
drawing the boundaries of the criminal law even more widely. Beginning with
a brief description of the law in each jurisdiction, this article analyzes the
gendered and (hetero)normative role of consent in HIV nondisclosure offenses.
Through a comparison with the law on sadomasochism, the article questions
whether such offenses are rightly categorized as assaults or as sexual assaults.
Following a critical engagement with the reasoning in recent Canadian
*University of Edinburgh. The author acknowledges the advice and support of Vanessa
Munro, Gillian Calder, and Gerry Ferguson in the writing of this article. Thanks also to
David Gurnham and Imogen Jones, the editors of this special issue, and Roger Levesque,
the Chief Editor of this journal, for their feedback, patience, and enthusiasm; to Cher Paul,
the very competent and charming copy editor; and to the anonymous reviewer for valuable
constructive comments. This paper forms part of a program of papers presented at the
fourth seminar in the Economic and Social Research Council series ‘‘Criminalising Con-
tagion: Legal and Ethical Challenges of Disease Transmission and the Criminal Law,’’ at the
University of Manchester, U.K., Summer 2014.
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jurisprudence in the area, the article will conclude by addressing the question of
how future HIV transmission cases should be tackled. It is argued that in the
absence of a policy that precludes criminalization of nondisclosure, the position
in England and Wales is to be preferred.
Keywords: consent, fraud, HIV transmission, criminalization, sexual assault
I N TRODUCT ION
Even though there may be a moral duty to disclose one’s HIV status to
a sexual partner, the question of whether or not HIV transmission should
ever be criminalized remains open to debate. Many public health ofﬁcials
and medical professionals answer this question in the negative.1 None-
theless, the trend toward criminalization seem to be increasing,2 even
though major improvements in antiretroviral drugs have signiﬁcantly
increased the chances of a person with HIV having a normal life expec-
tancy.3 Notwithstanding the continuing efforts of some criminal lawyers
to resist any use of criminal law here,4 criminalization of the intentional
or reckless transmission of (or even exposure to) HIV seems no longer
to be controversial for some lawyers.5 Others argue for minimal criminal
intervention even as they reluctantly accepted some criminalization as
1. See, e.g., A. O’Leary & R.J. Wolitski, Moral Agency and the Sexual Transmission of
HIV, 135:3 PSYCHOL. BULL. 478–94 (2009); M.D. Phillips & S. Clegg, Is Punishment and
Criminalisation of HIV Transmission Justiﬁed?, 88 SEXUALY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS
A68–A69 (2012), doi: 10.1136/sextrans-2012-050601c.178.
2. Leslie Pickering Francis & John G. Francis, Is Criminalizing Health-Related Behaviors
Dangerous to Others? Disease Transmission, Transmission-Facilitation, and the Importance of
Trust, 6:1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 47–63 (2012).
3. Canadian HIV/Legal Network,HIV Non-Disclosure and the Criminal Law: An analysis
of two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, at 7 (2012) [hereinafter, CHALN],
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/publicationsdocEN.php?ref¼1326; Indraveer Chatterjee,
HIV and Consent: When Yes Means No, 8:4 HIV AUSTRL. 20–22, 21 (2009).
4. See, e.g., M. Weait, Unsafe Law: Health, Rights and the Legal Response to HIV, INT’L
J.L. IN CONTEXT (2013, forthcoming); Francis & Francis, Criminalizing Health-Related
Behaviors, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Lisa Cherkassy, Being Informed: The Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and
Consent when Transmitting HIV, 74:3 J. CRIM. L. 242–58 (2010); John Flaherty, Clarifying
the Duty to Warn in HIV Transference Cases, 54 CRIM. L.Q. 60–78 (2008).
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inevitable.6 It is fair to say, then, that there is no consensus on the crimi-
nalization question.
Different jurisdictions have drawn the boundaries of criminal liability in
varying places. As Grant points out in her comparison of the relevant laws
in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and England and Wales, Canada
seems to take a relatively punitive approach to the nondisclosure of positive
HIV status: exposure as well as transmission is prosecuted, and on occasion
even sex with condoms has resulted in conviction; in addition, the offense
charged can be either assault or sexual assault, or an aggravated form of
either offense, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for aggra-
vated sexual assault and fourteen years for aggravated assault.7 Many U.S.
states also impose similar kinds of exposure offenses, although there have
been recent moves at the federal level to repeal criminal offenses related to
HIV.8 On the other hand, more narrow parameters of liability have been
6. Isabel Grant, The Prosecution of Non-Disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to Rethink
Cuerrier, 5:1 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 7–59 (2011); JAMES CHALMERS, LEGAL RESPONSES
TO HIV AND AIDS (2008); Isabel Grant, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Crim-
inalisation of the Non-Disclosure of HIV, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 123–80 (2008). Although this
author’s position is that sexual (or other) nonintentional transmission of HIV ought not to
be criminalized, this article does not engage directly with either moral or political arguments
on this question. Nor does it grapple with the wealth of critical public health literature on
why criminalizing HIV transmission should be avoided. This literature broadly centers on
preventive concerns and on the stigmatizing of those living with HIV/AIDS, particularly the
impact of criminalization on racialized and immigrant populations, and on trans people (see,
e.g., Jaime Grant, Lisa Mottet, & Justin Tanis, Executive Summary, in INJUSTICE AT EVERY
TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, National Center for Transgender Equality, 2011), who report
that trans people in the U.S. have an HIV infection rate of over four times the national
average, with trans people of color having an even higher rate). For the purposes of this
article, these arguments are bracketed in favor of focusing on legal justiﬁcations for crim-
inalizing certain kinds of sexual activity but not others, in order to demonstrate the het-
eronormative and gendered expectations underpinning the formulation and application of
the criminal law.
7. Grant, Prosecution, supra note 6, at 44.
8. According the Center for HIV Law and Policy, thirty-two states and two territories
explicitly criminalize exposure to HIV, not only through sexual intercourse but also through
needle sharing and in some states bodily ﬂuids; see ENDING AND DEFENDING AGAINST HIV
CRIMINALIZATION: STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS, Vol. 1, 263 (CHLP’s
Positive Justice Project, 1st ed. 2010), http:// www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/view/564.
In 2011, a bill referred to as the ‘‘Repeal Existing Policies that Encourage and Allow Legal
HIV Discrimination Act,’’ the ‘‘REPEAL HIV Discrimination Act,’’ or the ‘‘REPEAL Act’’
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set in England andWales, for example, where only transmission of, and not
simply exposure to, HIV is criminalized, and only those are prosecuted
who have actual knowledge of their HIVþ status and have consistently
ﬂouted medical advice about protected sex and/or disclosure. The issues
that are often still hotly debated across jurisdictions include: the level of
knowledge of HIV status required on the part of the accused, the type and
seriousness of the offense to be charged, and whether or not liability
depends on the actual transmission of the infection.
Given the current criminalization trend, the motivating question of this
article is whether or not sexual transmission of HIV, without speciﬁc
consent to the risk of such transmission, should be categorized as an assault
or a sexual assault, and what difference that (re)categorization might make.
For the purposes of this article, references to the transmission of HIV
should be taken to indicate the sexual transmission of HIV and not trans-
mission by other means (e.g., needle sharing), as these are issues that
require separate analysis.
In the argument that follows, the criminalization discourses in Canada
and England and Wales that underpin and permeate the debates over HIV
transmission will be explored. Following the precedents set by the English
cases of R v. Dica9 and R v. Konzani,10 in 2008, the Crown Prosecution
Service in England and Wales published guidelines indicating which HIV
transmission cases should be prosecuted.11 This legal regime, which focuses
on the bodily harm caused by actual transmission in nondisclosure cases, will
be compared to that of Canada, in particular the recent HIV transmission
cases heard at the Supreme Court of Canada (R v. Mabior, and R v. D.C.), as
(H.R. 3053) was introduced (http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3053#overview),
following the announcement of a new national HIV/AIDS strategy by the White House; see
National HIV/AIDS Strategy: Federal Implementation Plan, Step 3.3 at 26 (July 2010), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/ﬁles/documents/nhas-implementation.pdf. The bill allowed for con-
sultation on and review of existing criminal offenses to ascertain whether they discriminate
against those living with HIV/AIDS, and are contradictory to public health goals. Although
the Bill was not enacted, this approach, and the support and attention of the White House,
is promising for those who wish to challenge the inevitability of criminalization.
9. R v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103.
10. R v. Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706.
11. Crown Prosecution Service, Intentional or Reckless Sexual Transmission of Infection
(n.d.) [hereinafter, Crown Prosecution Guidelines], http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/int
entional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission_of_infection_guidance/.
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well as the 2012 case of R v. Hutchinson,12 where the accused, who had
sabotaged condoms hoping that his partner would get pregnant, was con-
victed of sexual assault. These jurisdictions have been chosen as examples of
two regimes, at almost opposite ends of the criminalization spectrum, in
which recent changes have set new benchmarks for criminal responsibility.
One (England and Wales) has set rather narrow limits on the criminal law,
whilst the other (Canada) has set far broader parameters, and lately has begun
to include other sorts of cases (such as nondisclosure of lack of birth control)
as analogous to the HIV cases, drawing the boundaries of the criminal law
even more widely.
Beginning with a brief description of the law in each jurisdiction, this
article will analyze the gendered and heteronormative role that consent
plays in HIV nondisclosure offenses, and question whether such offenses
are rightly categorized as assaults or as sexual assaults. Having critically
engaged with the reasoning in recent Canadian jurisprudence in the area,
the article will conclude by addressing the question of how future HIV
transmission cases should be tackled. It will be argued that in the absence of
a policy that precludes criminalization of nondisclosure, the position in
England and Wales is to be preferred.
I . THE CURRENT LAW ON SEXUAL TRANSMISS ION OF
H IV IN CANADA AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES
A. England and Wales
The boundaries of criminal liability are drawn relatively narrowly in Eng-
land andWales. The current law is to be found in the cases of R v. Dica and
R v. Konzani,13 as well as a set of Prosecution Guidelines produced by the
12. R v. Mabior 2012 SCC 27; R v. D.C. 2012 SCC 48; R. v. Hutchinson (2013) NSCA 1,
June 4, 2012, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
13. For comment on these cases, see Vanessa Munro, On Responsible Relationships and
Irresponsible Sex: Criminalising the Reckless Transmission of HIV, R v. Dica and R v.
Konzani, 112–15, 19:1 CHILD. & FAM. L.Q. (2007); MatthewWeait, Criminal Law and the
Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica, 86:1 MOD. L. REV. 121 (2005). The ﬁrst prose-
cutions in England or Wales were pursued against racialized and/or immigrant male
defendants engaging in heterosexual sex, but the law has since been used also to crimi-
nalize white, British, heterosexual and homosexual men and women. See NAM AIDS-
Map, Timeline of Developments in the Criminalisation of HIV and STI Transmission in the
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Crown Prosecution Service. R v. Dica departed from the nineteenth-
century precedent set by R v. Clarence,14 which held that consent to sexual
intercourse necessarily entailed consent to the risk of transmission of sex-
ually transmitted infections. In contrast, the court in Dica, as further
clariﬁed by the court in Konzani, held that notwithstanding valid consent
to sexual intercourse, intentional or reckless transmission of HIV will result
in a charge under Section 18 (wounding or causing grievous bodily harm
with intent) or Section 20 (inﬂicting grievous bodily harm) of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861. However, explicit and informed consent can
provide a defense: parties can consent to sex that involves the risk of HIV
transmission if, and only if, the noninfected party knows of and con-
sciously undertakes to run that speciﬁc risk.
The Crown Prosecution Guidelines (which cover the sexual transmis-
sion of any infections, not only HIV)15 emphasize that an offense will be
‘‘difﬁcult to prove to the requisite high standard’’ since it requires not only
knowledge of infection, but also recklessness in its transmission. This, they
say, means that those who take appropriate and reasonable precautions not
to transmit the infection are unlikely to be demonstrably reckless. Only
cases of transmission will be pursued (unless it can be shown that the
defendant intentionally attempted but failed to transmit the infection).16
The Guidelines stress that only cases with robust factual and scientiﬁc/
medical evidence of both transmission and the direction of transmission
between the parties will be taken forward. They also explicitly state that the
charge can only ever be one of assault, not rape, although the transmission
of an infection can be an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes fol-
lowing a sexual assault conviction.17
Although this allows for fairly limited opportunities to impose the crim-
inal law, some commentators have raised concerns about: the ways in
UK (n.d.), http://www.aidsmap.com/Timeline-of-developments-in-the-criminalisation-
of-HIV-and-STI-transmission-in-the-UK/page/1504201/.
14. R v. Clarence (1988) 22 QBD 23.
15. The ﬁrst successful prosecution for sexual transmission of Hepatitis B was in 2008.
16. However, in January 2010, in Scotland, which has a separate criminal jurisdiction to
that of England and Wales, Mark Devereaux pled guilty to the UK’s ﬁrst prosecution for an
HIV exposure offense, charged as ‘‘culpable and reckless conduct’’. For comment see, BBC
News, Alarm over Reckless HIV Sex Case, Jan. 20, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_
news/scotland/north_east/8469238.stm.
17. Crown Prosecution Guidelines, supra note 11.
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which charging and prosecuting decisions, as well as judicial expectations of
appropriate behavior, may vary depending on whether or not the sex takes
place in the context of a monogamous, long-term, and heterosexual rela-
tionship18; and whether liability ought to attach notwithstanding a real fear
that disclosure, or a request that condoms be used, might be met with
a violent or abusive response.19 These concerns subsist despite the recent
Prosecution Guidelines.
B. Canada
In Canada, the apposite case is R v. Cuerrier, though the recent cases of R v.
Mabior and R v. D.C. have further developed the Cuerrier rules. In 1998,
the majority in Cuerrier held that the accused person, who had not dis-
closed their HIV positive status to their sexual partners, was guilty of an
aggravated assault even though the virus was not transmitted. Gaining
consent to sexual activity simpliciter is therefore not sufﬁcient to protect
the accused against criminal charge; again, there must be consent to sexual
activity that carries the risk of HIV transmission. Drawing on the test for
fraud in commercial cases (which requires both deception and deprivation
or risk of deprivation), the majority held that failure to disclose positive
HIV status prior to sexual activity could amount to a fraud that would
vitiate consent to sex, as long the there was a ‘‘signiﬁcant risk of serious
bodily harm.’’20 The question of what amounted to a signiﬁcant risk was not
clearly answered by the court, and it was suggested obiter dicta, that there
may be cases, such as where a condom was used, where the risk of harm was
not signiﬁcant.21 No prosecutorial guidelines, similar to those produced in
England and Wales, exist to support prosecutorial decision-making around
such details as, for example, what counts as a ‘‘signiﬁcant risk.’’
Many academics and activists have been critical of this approach (both
those who wish to widen and those who wish to narrow the net of crim-
inalization here). Cuerrier, it has been argued, neglected to engage in
a proper discussion of sexual assault,22 and set a threshold of harm that
18. Munro, On Responsible Relationships, supra note 13; Grant, Prosecution, supra note 6.
19. CHALN, supra note 3.
20. R v. Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371 at { 128.
21. Id. at { 129.
22. Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, HIV, Consent and Criminal Wrongs, 57:4
CRIM. L.Q. 464–85 (2011).
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is unacceptably vague, rendering the law uncertain, such that subsequent
courts have been inconsistent in their application of Cuerrier, resulting in
arbitrary outcomes.23 Fast-forward ten years, through various interpreta-
tions of Cuerrier,24 toMabior, where in 2008, the accused was convicted at
ﬁrst instance of six counts of aggravated sexual assault for not disclosing his
positive HIV status to several female partners (and again, the virus was not
actually transmitted). On appeal, four of these convictions were quashed
either because the accused’s viral load was low or because a condom had
been used. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC).
This appeal was heard alongside that of R v. D.C.; a woman had been
convicted of one count of aggravated sexual assault because she failed to
disclose her positive HIV status prior to the ﬁrst act of sexual intercourse
with her male partner, even though they stayed together for four years after
her disclosure, and she did not transmit the virus to him. The charge arose
in the wake of a successful prosecution of the male partner for violence
against D.C. and her son. On appeal, her conviction was quashed on the
basis of her low viral count, and again the Crown appealed to the SCC.
In their 2012 decision, the SCC responded to the concern that the Cuer-
rier test needed clariﬁcation, particularly taking into account contemporary
social views and scientiﬁc and medical advances, but did so by placing a more
onerous burden on the HIVþ individual to disclose their status. Although
the Crown argued, in both cases, that the HIVþ person should have to
disclose their status to a potential partner, regardless of the level of risk of
harm, in all sexual encounters,25 the SCC ultimately held that not all non-
disclosures were criminal. However, contrary to Justice Cory’s suggestion in
Cuerrier, neither condom use nor a low viral load would, in isolation, be
sufﬁcient to decrease the risk of transmission below the ‘‘signiﬁcant’’ thresh-
old. Conﬁning their remarks mainly to heterosexual penile-vaginal penetra-
tion, the Supreme Court held that, only where an accused person had both
a low viral load and had made proper use of contraception would the risk fall
below the watermark of ‘‘signiﬁcant.’’ Moreover, ‘‘signiﬁcant risk’’ was to be
understood to mean there was a ‘‘realistic possibility’’ of transmitting the
virus. In coming to this conclusion, it has been argued, the court has further
23. CHALN, supra note 3; Grant, Boundaries, supra note 6; Grant, Prosecution, supra
note 6.
24. Grant, Prosecution, supra note 6.
25. See also Flaherty, Clarifying the Duty, supra note 5.
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and inappropriately widened the net of criminalization, and has have made
a ‘‘bad law worse,’’26 not least because of the difﬁculty of establishing at any
moment in time an accurate estimation of viral load.27
The legal framework for criminalizing nondisclosure of HIV status in
Canada is thus starkly different from that in England andWales. In Canada
exposure as well as transmission is criminalized, thus the test for criminal
liability relies on the level of risk of harm; and since the nondisclosure is
said to amount to a fraud that vitiates consent to sexual intercourse, the
accused is (usually) charged with a sexual assault. In contradistinction,
prosecutions for nondisclosure of HIV status in England and Wales are
aimed only at cases of actual transmission, and criminal liability therefore
depends not on the level of risk inherent in the activities in which parties
engage, but the presence or absence of informed consent. Importantly,
where consent is not informed, or where the defendant has intended to
transmit the infection, an assault or attempted assault (rather than sexual
assault or rape) charge arises, since consent to the sexual intercourse sub-
sists. The net of criminalization is thus cast more widely in Canada than in
England and Wales. Setting aside general arguments against overcrimina-
lization28 and long-standing critiques of the criminalization of HIV trans-
mission in particular, what more can be said about the different approaches
of these two regimes? The next section will consider the normative role that
consent plays in each location.
I I . THE NORMAT IVE ROLE OF CONSENT
A. Consent as a Defense?
In England and Wales, the transmission cases are not pursued as sexual
offenses, but offenses of bodily harm. The question of whether or not HIV
26. CHALN, supra note 3, at 9.
27. Isabel Grant, Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in HIV, 54
MCGILL L.J. 389–404 (2009); Grant, Prosecution, supra note 6. Chalmers has also suggested
that the court in Mabior pays insufﬁcient attention the question of whether the accused
himself knew about the risk of harm and thus ignores themens rea requirement of fraud (James
Chalmers,Catching Upwith the Science, Leaving Culpability Behind: Recent Developments in the
Criminalisation of HIV Transmission and Exposure, 1–15, 10 (2013, on ﬁle with author)).
28. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMI-
NAL LAW (2009).
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transmission offenses are sexual in nature is relevant for, amongst other
reasons, the appropriate role that consent should play. In England and
Wales, for example, a lack of consent is part of the actus reus of sexual
offenses. Having consent as part of the offense deﬁnition signals, as it does
in the law of sexual offenses generally, that because the behavior has,
usually, positive social value (or, is deemed sufﬁciently unharmful to be
of neutral value), the criminal law should not discourage it; it is prima facie
lawful, unless consent is absent.29 In the law of assault, consent can offer
a defense, if the assault takes place in particular circumstances (such as
surgery, tattooing, etc.) or where the harm does not go above a certain
level.30 Where consent acts as a defense, the implication is that the pro-
scribed act is not in itself of value to society, that it is prima facie unlawful
and therefore to be discouraged, and criminal sanction is only avoided
where consent can be, and has been, secured.
To position HIV transmission as a bodily harm, that is, an assault, rather
than a sexual assault or rape, signals that the transmission of disease is not
a valued social goal. However, it also results in various peculiarities. Firstly,
the rules on consent to injury in England andWales have been clearly set in
R v. Brown (the ‘‘homosexual sadomasochist’’ case), and engaging in sexual
behavior that carries the risk of HIV transmission seems to be caught under
these rules. This is because the Court in Brown drew the line of permissible
contact at actual bodily harm (ABH); injury causing (or surpassing) ABH
cannot be consented to, unless in the context of one of the established
exceptions (such as surgery). This seems inconsistent, though, with the
later case ofDica, which both approved Brown, and yet allowed for consent
to the risk of serious bodily harm (i.e., the transmission of HIV through
sex) where the noninfected party knowingly consents to that risk. This
author has previously argued that this is contradictory.31 This contradic-
tion may not be readily apparent; it might be argued, for instance, that
Brown deals with circumstances of actual harm, whereasDica allows merely
the possibility of consenting to the risk of harm, and so the cases are not
29. Compare with the argument made by Michelle Madden-Dempsey and Jonathan
Herring (Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justiﬁcation, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 467–91
(2007)), that sexual penetration per se requires justiﬁcation.
30. R v. Brown [1994] 1 AC 212.
31. Sharon Cowan, The Pain of Pleasure: Consent and the Criminalisation of Sado-
Masochistic ‘‘Assaults’’, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL LAW IN HONOUR OF SIR GERALD GOR-
DON 126–40 (James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick, & Lindsay Farmer eds., 2010).
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directly comparable. The facts of these two cases may also appear disana-
logous. Consider, however, that where there is consent to the risk of HIV
transmission, neither the risk of transmission nor transmission itself will
result in prosecution for assault. Consensual SM activity on the other hand
can be prosecuted whether or not it causes harm, since activity that simply
risks the kind of ‘‘harm’’ caused in Brown could well be charged as an
attempted assault. Therefore the ‘‘risk versus actuality of harm’’ question
is not the factor that distinguishes the criminal (SM) from the noncriminal
(HIV transmission).
Secondly, the Court in Dica unequivocally dissociates itself from the
facts of Brown; SM cases are about serious violence, inﬂicted for sexual
gratiﬁcation, and Dica is not.32 In contrast, those who knowingly and
consensually risk transmission of HIV (a potentially lethal disease) are
depicted in Dica as honest, accountable sexual subjects who have made
responsible choices; the risk of disease is portrayed as an inherent risk of
normal sexual intercourse, just like pregnancy,33 whereas the risks engaged
during SM encounters are unjustiﬁable and show their participants to be
irresponsible and dangerous. Actions such as those performed by Mr. Dica
are by any measurement morally and ethically wrong, as they are not
founded on concepts such as mutuality of sexual expression, respect for
sexual integrity, communication, or a regard for the personal autonomy
that grounds the ability to carve out one’s life and goals, as far as that is
possible. But this is not to argue that engaging in sexual activity that risks
HIV transmission should necessarily be subject to the same levels of crim-
inalization as SM sex (and indeed this author has argued elsewhere34
against the current regime of criminalization of SM). One possible argu-
ment, then, is that neither SM nor transmission of HIV should be crim-
inalized. In (some) SM sex, the risk of bodily harm is inherent—injury is
not the intended outcome, but rather a possible secondary by-product of
sexual pleasure. Participants can (and the point is, do) explicitly agree to
run the risk of injury for the sake of sexual pleasure. Similarly, it could be
argued that harm that results from transmission of HIV is a risk, like
32. Dica, [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, at { 47.
33. Id.
34. Cowan, The Pain of Pleasure, supra note 31; Sharon Cowan, Criminalizing SM:
Disavowing the Erotic, Instantiating Violence, in THE STRUCTURES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
59–84 (R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo, & Victor Tadros eds.,
2012).
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pregnancy, inherent within ‘‘normal’’ sexual intercourse.35 Disease, and
therefore serious bodily harm, is not the intended result, only a secondary
by-product of sexual pleasure. Two people can therefore explicitly (through
sharing knowledge of disease status) consent to taking such a risk for the
purposes of pleasure. In each case, the risk, and even the actualization of
harm, is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.36 There may be
policy reasons—for example, sending a message about the importance of
mutual agreement in sexual activity, and the protection of public health—
that support the criminalization of reckless (nonconsensual) HIV trans-
mission. Combine with this, in the HIV cases, the abuse of trust and lack of
respect for sexual autonomy and communication, and we may well have
a stronger case forDica-type criminalization (nonconsensual violence) than
for Brown-type criminalization (consensual sex).37
However, the question of whether and how far to criminalize HIV
transmission seems to raise something of a dilemma for those who are
generally opposed to criminalization; although alternative penalties and
public health approaches might well be more suitable than criminal justice
responses to the potential spread of infection, there is also, arguably,
a strong case to be made for punishing those who fail to respect the sexual
autonomy of their partners by engaging in sexual contact without gaining
consent to known risks of infection of a particular disease or virus.38 Is it
consistent, then, to call for less criminalization generally, and restricted
criminalization of SM, as well as tough criminal penalties for those who
fail to disclose their HIV status prior to sexual activity?
35. Compare the judgment of Justice Farrar in R v. Hutchinson: ‘‘At its most basic,
biological level, pregnancy is a ‘natural’ consequence for women who have sex, in a way that
a disease like HIV is not’’ ({ 206).
36. There is arguably an important distinction between risk/inﬂiction of injury as a sec-
ondary by-product of sexual pleasure, on the one hand, and risk/inﬂiction of injury as a means
to the end of sexual pleasure on the other. However for the purposes of this article, the
argument is that consensual sexual pleasure is an outcome that can justify at least some risk/
inﬂiction of injury, whether that risk/injury is a secondary by-product of or a means to an end
of sexual pleasure. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting clariﬁcation on this point.
37. For other views on the comparison between SM and the sexual transmission of HIV,
see Chatterjee, HIV and Consent, supra note 3; Cherkassy, Being Informed, supra note 5;
David Gurnham, Risky Sex and Manly Diversions: Contours of Consent in HIV Transmission
and Rough Horseplay Cases, in THE CRIMINAL LAW AND BIOETHICAL CONFLICT:
WALKING THE TIGHTROPE 88–101 (2012).
38. Mathen & Plaxton, HIV, Consent, supra note 22.
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It might be consistent to argue for less criminalization of SM alongside
restricting HIV-type criminalization to cases where transmission has
occurred. In those cases where the HIV virus is not transmitted to the
‘‘unknowing’’ partner, no physical harm has befallen the complainant;
arguably, unlike those who are subsequently infected, they suffer no real
harm or injury, notwithstanding the lack of consent. However, Gardner
and Shute39 have argued in the context of rape that labeling an activity as
criminal harm does not necessarily rely solely on whether or not the com-
plainant consciously experiences harm. They point out that if a man rapes
an unconscious woman, even if that woman never ﬁnds out that he has
done so, a moral wrong has still been committed even if she is not ‘‘harmed’’
in the traditional sense. It is wrongful in that there has been a violation of
her sexual autonomy40 and an invasion of her bodily integrity. In the HIV
non-disclosure example, there may not be the same sort of nonconsensual
invasion of bodily integrity, as the unknowing partner has consented to sex,
but there is certainly a breach of sexual autonomy.41 This might, in itself,
warrant a criminal law response. It is not clear, though, whether this is
a strong enough reason in the HIV context to counter the objections from
those who wish to minimize or eradicate criminalization and promote
a nonpunitive approach to the promotion of public health42; it is even less
clear that it justiﬁes lumping the exposure cases and the actual transmission
cases together under one offense heading of aggravated (sexual) assault.
In any case, what a comparison between SM cases and cases of HIV
transmission demonstrates is the presence of normative ideals that inform
judicial thinking about what constitutes ‘‘regular’’ sex, which is undertaken
39. John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 193–227 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
40. Id. at 208. For critique of their account and application of the harm principle in this
example, seeHamish Stewart, The Limits of the Harm Principle, 4:1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 17–35,
26–32 (2010).
41. The concept of sexual autonomy is the subject of much feminist critique and debate.
See, e.g., KATHERINE O’DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN THE LAW (1985); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); F. Olsen, Consti-
tutional Law: Feminist Critique and the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT.
319–27 (1993); NICOLA LACEY, UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND
SOCIAL THEORY (1998); Sharon Cowan, Choosing Freely: Theoretically Reframing the Concept
of Consent, in CHOICE AND CONSENT: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW AND SUB-
JECTIVITY 91–105 (Rosemary Hunter ed., 2007).
42. Francis & Francis, Criminalizing Health-Related Behaviors, supra note 2.
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by responsible citizens and therefore worthy of legal protection, as opposed
to sex that is properly risky and relished by deviant sexual others. In
England and Wales at least, although it is not possible to be a responsible,
sexually active SM participant, if activity risks or causes actual bodily harm,
it is possible to be a responsible, sexually active HIVþ citizen who risks
(and may or may not cause) grievous bodily harm, as long as the risk of
transmission is disclosed to consenting sexual partners.
B. Consent, Risk, and Harm
In Canada, courts dealing with the HIV transmission cases have set out an
even more expansive framework of criminalization than England and
Wales around ‘‘risky’’ sex, taking a relatively punitive approach to nondi-
sclosing HIVþ persons who engage in sexual intercourse. R v. Mabior and
R v. D.C. have resulted in a hierarchy of responsibilization, whereby only
very responsible citizens can be assured that they will not be prosecuted for
assault or sexual assault: the most responsible always disclose their HIV
status; the less responsible but noncriminal are those who do not disclose
but who engage only in nonrisk activities, use condoms, and undergo
antiretroviral treatment. Irresponsible sexual subjects are those who fail
to disclose, even where they either use condoms or have a low viral load.
What is notable is the role that consent (or its absence) plays in the
Canadian context. In both jurisdictions, consent plays a key role in the
attribution of criminal responsibility. In England and Wales, parties to sex
can consent to the risk of HIV transmission. Where there is no consent to
the risk of transmission (because there has been no disclosure of HIV
status), if transmission occurs there has been an offense (of bodily harm).
In Canada, parties can also consent to the risk of HIV transmission.
Obviously, where the complainant has been exposed to a risk, and there
has been no disclosure of that risk, there can be no consent to that risk. At
that point, the ‘‘signiﬁcant harm’’ test comes into play. This means that in
Canada, a lack of disclosure and absence of consent does not automatically
mean an offense has been committed; although consent has been gained
dishonestly (fraudulently), liability only attaches where the fraud gives rise
to a signiﬁcant risk of serious harm (regardless of whether transmission
occurs). Unlike the position in England and Wales, consent does not do all
the conceptual work of grounding criminal liability. As such, the Canadian
courts have not had to address the question of whether or not consent to
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the risk of HIV transmission is akin to consent to, for example, the risk of
injury through SM sex, and therefore the normative role of consent seems
less central here. And this focus on harm rather than consent may seem
anomalous, given that the subjective state of mind of the complainant, and
the question of sexual autonomy, is so important in the Canadian judicial
approach to sexual offenses more generally.43
Flaherty44 has argued that the only way to fully respect the autonomy of
the unknowing sexual partner is for Canadian criminal law to introduce
a mandatory duty to warn of the risk of HIV transmission, regardless of the
probability of infection, thereby both responsibilizing the HIVþ person
and valuing the consent and choice of their partner over and above the
luck-driven, outcome-based question of whether or not signiﬁcant harm
has occurred. His approach is similar to the one adopted in England and
Wales, in that consent (or its absence) is the factor that drives the attribu-
tion of criminal responsibility—except for fact that in England and Wales,
liability only attaches where there has been actual transmission. In that
sense, the question of whether there should be a duty to disclose and gain
informed consent is always, in England and Wales, a retrospective one.
However, Flaherty calls for a prospective mandatory duty to warn in all
cases, whether or not transmission occurred. Although such a rule would
have the beneﬁt of being extremely clear, it draws the parameters of the
criminal law very widely indeed. It may also be particularly problematic for
those who are already vulnerable—women with violent male partners, for
example.45
Alternatively, Grant46 has argued that although some criminalization for
nondisclosure of HIV status may now be unavoidable, only those nondi-
sclosing HIVþ persons who actually transmit the infection, and thus inﬂict
harm, should be criminally liable in Canada. This is a preferable approach
in that it restricts the application of the criminal law to the more serious
category of actualized rather than risked harms, and respects the choice and
autonomy of the unknowing party without having to focus on assessing the
43. R v. Ewanchuk (1989) 22 QBD 23, Major J. at 28.
44. Flaherty, Clarifying the Duty, supra note 5.
45. CHALN, supra note 3; Grant, Rethinking Risk, supra note 27; Munro,On Responsible
Relationships, supra note 13.
46. Grant, Rethinking Risk, supra note 27.
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probability of infection, which is likely to be factually difﬁcult for courts to
ascertain on the evidence available to them.47
I I I . SEXUAL TRANSMISS ION OF H IV :
SEX OR V IOLENCE?
The ‘‘sex or violence?’’ question has not been widely considered in the
context of HIV transmission.48 So what can we learn from other areas of
criminal law where there is a dispute about whether or not conduct
amounts to a sexual offense? It has been forcefully argued49 that sadomas-
ochism (SM) should be treated in law as principally sexual rather than
simply violent behavior. The sexual context and motivation of SM activity
gives reason to perceive and treat SM as consensual sex rather than
unwanted violence.50 Nonconsensual SM encounters would then amount
to sexual assaults rather than assaults. This is not to position sex and
violence as mutually exclusive; I have claimed elsewhere that the disavowal
of the erotic that takes place when law criminalizes SM as simply violence,
is unconvincing and in itself a form of violence.51 But there is good reason
to argue for the reconceptualization of SM as primarily sexual activity, and
to step away from the heteronormative construction of SM participants as
violent, perverted, and ‘‘risky,’’ as distinct from responsible, safe, and loving
non-SM sexual subjects.
What about failure to disclose the risk of HIV transmission—is this an
assault or a sexual assault? The argument set out above suggests that one
reason to see SM as sex is that categorizing SM that causes bodily harm as
sex allows for the possibility that consent can be given, whereas categorizing
the same behavior as violence rules out that possibility. But in the HIV
context, informed consent can provide a defense, regardless of whether HIV
47. Chalmers, Catching Up, supra note 27; Mathen & Plaxton,HIV, Consent, supra note
22; Grant, Rethinking Risk, supra note 27.
48. Compare Chalmers, Catching Up, supra note 27; Mathen & Plaxton, HIV, Consent,
supra note 22.
49. Lois Bibbings & Peter Alldridge, Sexual Expression, Body Alteration and the Defence of
Consent, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 356 (1993); Nicholas Bamforth, Sado-Masochism and Consent,
CRIM. L. REV. 661 (1994); Cowan, The Pain of Pleasure, supra note 31; Cowan, Crim-
inalising SM, supra note 24.
50. Cowan, The Pain of Pleasure, supra note 31; Cowan, Criminalising SM, supra note 24.
51. Cowan, Criminalizing SM, supra note 34.
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transmission is charged as sexual assault or assault. Other reasons must be
provided, then, to justify its categorization one way or the other. One such
reason might be that sexual assaults are usually perceived as more serious
than other sorts of assaults, and labeling them as sexual assaults therefore
indicates that we as a society take a more punitive stance toward them. So,
should HIV transmission offenses be categorized as sexual assaults?
A. Sexual Assault
The obvious initial question is, what makes an assault sexual? Sexual offenses
in England and Wales have appeared both in common law and statutory
form. Historically the offense in question was not sexual assault but ‘‘inde-
cent assault’’ (§§ 14, 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956), and indecency was
said in R v. Court52 to be that which the right-minded person would
understand to be indecent (a somewhat circular explanation). The com-
mon law deﬁnition of indecent, and its application by courts, was criticized
as ‘‘vague and unclear,’’53 and some argued for a less moralistic and more
straightforward offense of sexual assault.54 The various common law rules
and legislative interventions on sexual offenses were ﬁnally reformed and
codiﬁed by way of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which replaced indecent
assault with the offense of sexual assault (§ 3). Section 78 of the Act states
that activity is sexual if ‘‘a reasonable person would consider that (a) what-
ever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because
of its nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because
of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both)
it is sexual.’’55 The Explanatory Notes to the Sexual Offences Bill suggest
that this will rule out prosecutions for ‘‘obscure fetishes.’’56
In contrast, the Canadian Criminal Code does not address what is
meant by sexual for the purposes of sexual offenses, but under the common
52. R v. Court [1989] AC 28.
53. Jennifer Temkin & Andrew Ashworth, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Rape, Sexual
Assaults and the Problems of Consent, CRIM. L. REV. 328–46, 332 (2004).
54.George Sullivan, The Need for a Crime of Sexual Assault, CRIM. L. REV. 331–39 (1989).
55. Strangely, this deﬁnition does not apply to the offense of sexual activity in a public
lavatory (§ 71), which deﬁnes an activity as sexual ‘‘if a reasonable person would, in all the
circumstances but regardless of any person’s purpose, consider it to be sexual.’’
56. Explanatory Notes to the Sexual Offences Bill 2003, (House of Lords Bill 26) Clause
80: ‘‘Sexual,’’ { 65, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldbills/026/en/030
26x-b.htm#end. But see R v. Price [2003] EWCA Crim 2405.
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law, an offense is of a sexual nature where ‘‘the sexual integrity of the victim
is violated.’’57 The Crown does not have to prove sexual intent or sexual
gratiﬁcation on the part of the accused,58 and sexual assault can be com-
mitted even where the accused thinks they are playing a joke, as long as the
‘‘reasonable person’’ would see the touching as sexual.59 Whether an assault
is sexual in nature is, therefore, left to the hypothetical rational and objec-
tive fact ﬁnder to judge.
So, should HIV transmission offenses be treated as sexual assaults? The
context is certainly sexual. The HIVþ person does not necessarily intend to
harm their partner, but given that this kind of behavior is deemed to be
some species of assault, the reasonable person might well say that the assault
is sexual in nature (even though, as James Chalmers60 suggests, most
jurisdictions have treated the sexual context as ‘‘incidental’’). Both Canada
and England and Wales rely on the oft-berated concept of the ‘‘reasonable
person’’ here. The consequences of doing so are unpredictable, and the test
may not offer a neutral assessment of the issues at hand; the question of
‘‘reasonable to whom?’’ and the problem of the normative assumptions at
play when juries decide what kind of behavior is reasonable, is one that
plagues other sexual offenses, most markedly rape.61
In practice, to see HIV nondisclosure offenses as sexual in nature also
has a particular consequence in England and Wales: if we conceptualize
the sex consented to as ‘‘sex without the risk of (a potentially lethal)
disease,’’ then arguably the nondisclosure of positive HIV status under-
mines any consent to sex per se. Some writers have argued for just such an
approach.62 But courts in England and Wales have been reluctant to take
57. EDWARD L. GREENSPAN, MARC ROSENBERG, & MARIE HENEIN, MARTIN’S
ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE 578 (2012).
58. R v. Chase [1987] 2 SCR 293.
59. R v. Bernier [1998] 1 SCR 975.
60. Chalmers, Catching Up, supra note 27.
61. Cowan, Choosing Freely, supra note 41; L. Ellison & V.E. Munro, Of ‘‘Normal Sex’’
and ‘‘Real Rape’’: Exploring the Use of Socio-Sexual Scripts in (Mock) Jury Deliberation, 18:3
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 1–22 (2009); L. Ellison & V.E. Munro, A Stranger in the Bushes or an
Elephant in the Room?: Critical Reﬂections on Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of
a Mock Jury Study, 13:4 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 781–801 (2010).
62. Jonathan Herring, Mistaken Sex, CRIM. L. REV. 511 (2005). Compare Damian
Warburton, A Critical Review of English Law in Respect of Criminalising Blameworthy
Behaviour by HIVþ Individuals, J. CRIM. L. REV. 55 (2004); see also Rebecca Williams,
Deception, Mistake and Vitiation of the Victim’s Consent, LAW Q. REV. 124, 132 (2008).
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such a route,63 in part because sexual intercourse without consent
amounts to rape, and for many it would be incongruous, for labeling
reasons, to treat these cases as rape alongside those where there is no
consent to any form of sexual activity at all. Indeed, as discussed above,
the Crown Ofﬁce has stated speciﬁcally in its Prosecution Guidelines that
a nondisclosing HIVþ person who sexually transmits HIV is guilty of
assault, but not rape. It seems unlikely then that England and Wales will
pursue such a course of action any time soon.
These concerns and disinclinations can be avoided and the issue more
fully discussed with respect to Canada, where the offense of rape was
replaced in 1992 with sexual assault; therefore the problem of a rape con-
viction in these circumstances does not arise.64 So, is the conduct a sexual
offense or not? In Canada, HIV transmission cases have at times been dealt
with as (aggravated) assaults (Cuerrier), but at others as (aggravated) sexual
assaults (Mabior). Grant argues that it is not clear what motivates charging
one offense over the other, and that the court in Cuerrier has effectively
conﬂated the two.65 Should courts prefer sexual assault charges?
Two reasons might be given in favor of categorizing these cases as sexual
in Canada. First, a slightly different legal test applies depending on which
offense is charged. Sexual assault has its own consent provision (§ 273), over
and above the consent rules that apply to assault more generally (§ 265). In
the latter (assault) provision, consent can be vitiated by fraud (as well as
other factors such as force). If the nondisclosing HIVþ person is charged
with assault, s/he may claim an honest though unreasonable belief that the
unknowing partner consented to running the risk of transmission, for
example, if s/he believed that a sexual partner had knowledge of their HIV
status from a third party, or from readily available documentary evidence
such as a doctor’s letter left on a desk. However, sexual consent is said to
mean ‘‘voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual
activity in question’’ (§ 273.1(1)). Section 273.2(b) of the Canadian Criminal
Code sets out a higher threshold for mistaken belief of consent in sexual
assaults: a mistaken belief must also be reasonable, that is, the accused must
have taken reasonable steps to ascertain consent. Charging the accused with
63. R v. EB [2006] EWCA Crim 2945.
64. For discussion of this point, see Chalmers, Catching Up, supra note 27.
65. Grant, Prosecution, supra note 6, at 44, 48.
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a sexual assault arguably gives the complainant more protection against
frivolous or mendacious claims of mistaken belief in consent.
Secondly, on a slightly different tack, Mathen and Plaxton66 have
argued that treating a case of HIV nondisclosure as a sexual assault more
appropriately labels the behavior, since it exempliﬁes the core wrong of
a sexual assault: the infringement upon personal autonomy, and the objec-
tiﬁcation of a person through use of their body as means rather than an end
in itself. Although this may be a convincing picture of what constitutes the
wrong of sexual assault, their argument that this is a better approach than
the assault route rests on the view that a prosecution for assault must always
rely on an assessment of the level of physical harm (or risk of such harm)
caused by the faulty behavior, whereas a prosecution for sexual assault need
not. The harm of a sexual assault is not merely physical, they argue, but
arises in Gardner and Shute’s hypothetical unconscious rape example.67
Thus, deeming the assault sexual more fully and aptly protects complai-
nants in HIV nondisclosure cases, since the work of grounding criminal
liability is done by (the lack of) consent rather than an evaluation of the
level of harm imposed. This would bring Canadian law into line with that
in England and Wales, if only in the sense that consent becomes the
operative mechanism for establishing liability.
Are these two arguments persuasive enough to deﬁne HIV nondisclo-
sure cases as sexual assaults? It is not clear how many ‘‘honest belief in
consent’’ defenses are run in HIV nondisclosure cases, though there is
anecdotal evidence to suggest that this defense is rarely run in sexual assault
cases, so the ﬁrst reason may not in itself be sufﬁcient to mark the assaults
as sexual. What about the sexual autonomy argument, then? Although
focused on consent, arguably the Mathen and Plaxton line encourages us
to draw the parameters of the criminal law too widely, in that it allows for
exposure cases, where HIV has not been transmitted and the harm is
emotional/ rather than physical, to be charged and prosecuted alongside
those cases where HIV has been transmitted, and the complainant must
live with the harm caused by the virus for the rest of their life. Although
there may be good reasons to describe the core wrongs of sexual assault as
Mathen and Plaxton have done, and good reason to take psychological
harm seriously, application of their argument to HIV nondisclosure cases
66. Mathen & Plaxton, HIV, Consent, supra note 22.
67. Gardner & Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, supra note 39.
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may well overcriminalize. We must pay careful attention to the broader
consequences of labeling nondisclosure cases in this way. It is also impor-
tant to consider whether or not the over-individualistic tendencies of the
concept of autonomy dovetail too neatly with what Francis and Francis68
have described as an inappropriately individualistic approach to disease
transmission, one that neglects social responsibility for creating conditions
under which disease and stigma thrive, and undermines population rather
than one-to-one models of disease control.
B. Assault and Fraud
However, we must also pause to consider the appropriateness of labeling
such cases as assaults. For one thing, in Canada, for an assault charge to
be sustained, the prosecution must show that the complainant’s consent
results from the accused’s fraudulent behavior, that is, failure to disclose
positive HIV status renders suspect an apparent consent to sex. Tradition-
ally, jurisdictions such as Canada, and England and Wales, have drawn the
parameters of fraudulent sexual consent very narrowly.69 The worry about
proper labeling and censure of an accused who gains sexual consent by
fraudulent means is particularly acute in jurisdictions in which rape is still
an offense; a rape conviction for ‘‘trivial’’ fraud could dilute a relevant and
important distinction between, one the one hand, a lack of consent to sex
per se, and on the other, a disagreement about the conditions under which
consent was given. Arguably, only deception in those circumstances that go
to the heart of the agreement should be frauds that vitiate consent to sex.70
The problem is, of course, deciding which circumstances go to the heart of
68. Francis & Francis, Criminalizing Health-Related Behaviors, supra note 2.
69. See, e.g., the dissenting judgment of Justice Farrar in R v. Hutchinson. One notable
exception to the general trend is that of Justice L’Heureux-Dube´ in her minority judgment
in Cuerrier, where she reasoned that in the context of sexual activity, if the nondisclosure is
beyond the de minimis level, and relates to a material fact that goes to general life plans and
priorities, this would amount to fraud; therefore nondisclosure of HIV status to a sexual
partner could amount fraud that would vitiate consent, rendering the offense one of sexual
assault. Although the autonomy of the ‘‘unknowing’’ partner is more fully protected under
such a scheme, this is the widest possible interpretation of the impact that fraud should have
on apparent consent, and signiﬁcantly extends the boundaries of the criminal law.
70. Some have also argued that nondeceitful mistakes should also vitiate consent (e.g.
Herring, Mistaken Sex, supra note 62).
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the agreement and which do not. Alternatively, under Canadian law, a sex-
ual assault conviction need not rest on fraud, since it can always be argued
that there was no ‘‘voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question’’
in the ﬁrst place. Arguably, this broadens the possible bases on which
consent can be undermined; the in-built, common law–based, historically
narrow grounds for fraud would be displaced by Section 273.1(1) of the
Code. So, in HIV nondisclosure cases, is the consent of the complainant
non-voluntary and therefore void ab initio (i.e., a sexual assault), or is it
prima facie valid but vitiated through fraud (i.e., an assault)? That is,
should assault/fraud be the preferred route to demonstrating a lack of
consent, and what might be the consequences of taking that route?
The question of the appropriateness of the assault/fraud route was ad-
dressed in the recent Nova Scotia Court of Appeal case, R v. Hutchinson,
where the accused deliberately sabotaged condoms in the hope that his
partner would get pregnant, notwithstanding her explicit wish to avoid
pregnancy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated sexual assault.
The courts in England and Wales, in both Dica and Konzani, have been
very clear that consent to sexual intercourse does not entail consent to the
risk of sexually transmitted infections. Although dealing with a different set
of facts, the majority in Hutchinson agreed with this principle: in consent-
ing to sex, the complainant had consented only to protected sexual inter-
course, not unprotected sexual intercourse. In assessing whether or not there
had been consent to the ‘‘sexual activity in question,’’ as set out in § 273.1(1)
of the Canadian Criminal Code, the majority reasoned that the sexual
activity in question was sex with a condom. The fact that the complainant
had clearly expressed a speciﬁc wish and intent to have protected sex, in
order to avoid pregnancy, meant that the use of a properly operating
condom was an ‘‘inseparable component of her consent’’ ({ 31). In line
with R v. Ewanchuk the question of consent was a subjective one, to be
determined on the basis of the complainant’s state of mind. Therefore the
accused had committed a sexual assault. However, the minority in Hutch-
inson took the opposite view (though coming to the same conclusion that
the sex was ‘‘nonconsensual’’); the complainant had voluntarily agreed to
sexual intercourse, but her seemingly valid consent was vitiated by the
accused’s fraud, and he was therefore guilty of an assault. The majority
decision in Hutchinson offers support for the argument that sexual inter-
course under such circumstances is void ab inito, but Justice Farrar, in
dissent, argued strongly for the assault/fraud approach. In other words, the
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court argued over whether it mattered that consent be deemed nonexistent or
vitiated, since they both lead to the same outcome—lack of consent.
C. What difference does the distinction make?
In many ways it seems to make no difference whether an apparent consent
is discounted by way of vitiation (fraud) or invalidity (not a voluntary
agreement). Both lead to criminal sanctions for the accused. However,
Justice Farrar resisted the invalidity argument—that is, that there had been
no voluntary agreement to sex—on the basis that the deﬁnition of volun-
tary could be over-inclusive in its reach, thereby opening up more widely
than the traditional fraud approach, the kinds of circumstances that could
undermine consent ({ 153 et seq.). Moreover, Justice Farrar also expressed
concern that, in taking the sexual assault route and deﬁning the ‘‘sexual
activity in question’’ as sex with a condom, the majority decision in Hutch-
inson could lead to sexual assault prosecutions of women who lie to their
male partners about the use of contraception, such as the pill or an IUD. In
contrast, he argued, substantiating an assault charge requires the Crown to
prove that there had been a signiﬁcant risk of serious bodily harm, and the
complainant could be shown to have suffered such harm through
unwanted pregnancy and abortion in a way that a male partner who had
been deceived about contraception could not.
Categorizing the behavior as assault keeps the category of frauds that
undermine consent narrow, thus meeting overcriminalization concerns,
and appears to take gender into account in acknowledging the differential
impact of unprotected sex that leads to pregnancy. However Justice Farrar’s
reasoning that the complainant’s consent was vitiated was grounded in his
portrayal of her as having ‘‘changed her mind’’ about consent after the fact,
when she realized that the condoms were damaged ({ 165). This is a trou-
bling attitude, and one that invokes gendered assumptions about how,
when, and why women engage in sexual activity. As discussed above, there
seems to be no particular worry amongst the Canadian judiciary as to the
overcriminalization or potentially incorrect criminal labelling of those who
expose others to HIV. This stands in stark contrast to the efforts taken to
restrict the category of rape, to avoid overcriminalizing or wrongly labelling
men who deceive women into having sex with them, and to keep the
category of fraud that vitiates consent as narrow as possible. Moreover,
Justice Farrar’s concerns about the possible prosecution of women who lie
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about contraception, and the overbroadening of sexual assault to include
more ‘‘trivial’’ circumstances as undermining consent, were addressed by
the majority: the prosecution of women who deceive men about contra-
ception was said to be unlikely—whether or not the sex is protected is less
likely to be germane to a man’s decision to engage in sex, due to the
absence of a pregnancy risk ({{ 58–59); and the over-inclusiveness argu-
ment was said to be illusory, since voluntary agreement must be to the
‘‘sexual activity in question,’’ and circumstances such as age or promises of
marriage are arguably more easily separable from the sexual activity itself
than the question of whether or not the sex is protected ({ 81).
As with the SM example discussed above, narrowly criminalizing fraud-
ulent sexual consent while widely criminalizing deception about HIV sta-
tus speaks to the particular histories attached to each context, and the
underlying (gendered) normative assumptions about how men and women
engage in sexual activity with one another71: for example, that on the one
hand, in the HIV context there is a level playing ﬁeld of knowledge, power,
and the ability to be completely honest; and on the other, that women are
likely to ‘‘change their minds’’ about whether or not they consented to sex,
and ‘‘cry rape’’ retrospectively when some ‘‘trivial’’ aspect of the situation
turns out to be not as they expected. This is not to suggest that the assault/
fraud approach to criminalizing HIV transmission is preferable to charging
sexual assault, only that the kind of justiﬁcation given by Justice Farrar for
preferring it relies on unquestioned gendered assumptions about ‘‘normal’’
versus ‘‘problematic’’ sexual encounters.
In any case, it is debatable how comparable the HIV transmission cases
are to the ‘‘sabotaged condom’’ case; both appear to be about ‘‘safe’’ sex,
and could cover faulty or improper use of condoms. Both are also about the
validity of consent and the importance of mutual agreement and commu-
nication in sexual activity. However, the criminalization of HIV cases in
71. ‘‘Men and women’’ are intentionally focused on here, not because heterosexual re-
lationships are the only or most important kinds of sexual relationships, but because the law
in this area appears gendered and heteronormative in its approach: discussion of the
appropriate response to nondisclosure of HIV mainly happens in a heterosexual context,
prosecutions seem to be overwhelmingly brought against heterosexual men (Grant, Prose-
cution, supra note 6, at 30 n.103), and the recent Canadian cases do not seem to give clear
guidance on what might be a ‘‘signiﬁcant risk of serious harm’’ out with vaginal-penile
penetrative sex (CHALN, supra note 3); and because the fraud cases are overwhelmingly
focused on men deceiving women into consenting to sexual intercourse.
158 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 17 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2014
This content downloaded from 129.215.244.27 on Tue, 31 Mar 2015 05:22:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Canada has included exposure cases, and it is not clear that Hutchinson
would be expanded to cover cases where no pregnancy results (and arguably
the law should not be widened in this way). And although the ‘‘fraudulent
consent leading to an assault’’ approach prompts criminal liability only in
those cases (such as Hutchinson) where there is a signiﬁcant risk of serious
bodily harm, thus in principle keeping the ambit of criminalization narrow,
the ‘‘signiﬁcant risk of serious harm’’ test has been used to criminalize
exposure to, as well as transmission of, HIV, ultimately over-broadening
Canadian criminal law. Such an approach wrongly encompasses, for exam-
ple, the accused in R v D.C.; prosecutorial discretion could be applied to
preclude criminalization in her speciﬁc circumstances, where there was
a one-time incident of nondisclosure, no harm resulted, she and her partner
remained together for many years post-disclosure, and there was a history
of domestic violence against her. In this case the accused should not have
been charged with the same offense as those who recklessly transmit the
virus to unknowing partners, often repeatedly, and in explicit contraven-
tion of medical advice.72 Prosecuting her also arguably ‘‘trivializes sexual
assault and diverts the law from protecting women’s physical and sexual
autonomy.’’73 The focus of the criminal law should be sharpened here, not
extended.
CONCLUS ION
If criminalization is intended to deter those engaging in sex from with-
holding their HIV status, or to put it another way, to foster mutual and
open communication in sexual relations, it is not clear that this aim can be
met solely by legal means. Although, as Vanessa Munro has suggested, few
would reject any legal policy that would encourage communication: ‘‘[A]s
the Court of Appeal itself hinted at, there is a danger in assuming that
criminalising nonconformance will in itself bring this about. Indeed, par-
allels can be drawn with contexts of unwanted intercourse and rape, where
the need to decentre law and seek broader social and educational change
72. It might also be possible to argue that retrospective consent—if it is genuine and
free—could in limited circumstances circumvent an assault charge, but a full discussion of
the dangers of this (especially where retrospective consent takes place in the context of
domestic abuse) is beyond the scope of this article.
73. CHALN, supra note 3, at 8; see also Grant, Prosecution, supra note 6, at 50.
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has been acknowledged as being essential to the meaningful protection of
personal autonomy. . . . ’’74
Notwithstanding signiﬁcant concerns from activists, academics, and
policymakers over the criminalization of HIV nondisclosure, it is unlikely
that Canada or England and Wales will buck the current trend to crimi-
nalize at least some HIV nondisclosure cases. Yet, as the Canadian HIV/
AIDS Legal Network have reminded us: ‘‘Whether or not the Supreme
Court wants to admit it, people do have sex without full and complete
information about their sexual partners all the time—including in circum-
stances which can give rise to some risk of serious harm. Yet the law does
not step in to all such circumstances to override consent and criminally
prosecute the lack of disclosure of information.’’75 If we need criminal law
at all in the HIV transmission context, then, we need a more nuanced and
limited criminal law.
In comparing the HIV cases with both SM sex and the case of R v.
Hutchinson, I have argued that heteronormative and gendered expectations
underlie the ways in which the legal rules that govern each arena are
delineated and applied, particularly around who has what kind of sex, what
counts as risky, and what we can expect men and women to tell each other
both before and after sex. What is more, the (over)criminalization of HIV
nondisclosure stands in stark contrast to the worry that we must not
broaden criminal liability in sexual offenses to include those cases where
consent is undermined by a more ‘‘trivial’’ fraud than that pertaining to the
nature/purpose of the act, or the identity of the victim.
I have suggested, as have others before me, that we ought to be cautious
and mindful of the consequences of resorting to the criminal law, when
deciding not only what behavior to criminalize, but also the seriousness
with which we view that behavior, and the appropriate label that should
attach. If we must have criminal law in this area, only those HIV nondis-
closure cases that result in transmission should be prosecuted. Where
a jurisdiction does choose to criminalize exposure as well as transmission,
some cases should not be pursued, such as R v D.C., where in the context of
an on-going (and in that case, abusive) relationship there has been a single
act of nondisclosure followed by years of explicit consent to the risk of
transmission. Criminal liability in HIV nondisclosure cases could take the
74. Munro, On Responsible Relationships, supra note 13, at 119.
75. CHALN, supra note 3, at 8.
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form of sexual offenses, but only where harm (transmission) has occurred.
However, to distinguish those cases where the unknowing party has not
consented to sex with the risk of HIV transmission from those where there
is no consent to sex per se, it might be better to approach these as assaults
rather than sexual assaults, notwithstanding the fact that they occur within
a sexual context. As assaults, the test for criminal liability should rest on
informed consent rather than ‘‘signiﬁcant risk of serious harm,’’ but only
those cases resulting in the signiﬁcant harm of actual transmission should
be prosecuted.
OFFENSES OF SEX OR V IOLENCE? | 161
This content downloaded from 129.215.244.27 on Tue, 31 Mar 2015 05:22:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
